Random Topologies and the emergence of cooperation: the role of
  short-cuts by Vilone, Daniele et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
01
0.
35
47
v4
  [
ph
ys
ics
.so
c-p
h]
  2
8 A
pr
 20
11
Random topologies and the emergence of
cooperation: the role of short-cuts
D. Vilone1,∗, A. Sa´nchez1,2,3,∗∗, and J. Go´mez-Garden˜es3,4,∗∗∗
1 Grupo Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos (GISC), Departamento de
Matema´ticas, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 28911 Legane´s, Madrid, Spain
2 Instituto de Ciencias Matema´ticas CSIC-UAM-UC3M-UCM, 28049 Cantoblanco,
Madrid, Spain
3 Instituto de Biocomputacio´n y F´ısica de Sistemas Complejos, Universidad de
Zaragoza, Campus Rı´o Ebro, 50018 Zaragoza, Spain
4 Departamento de Matema´tica Aplicada, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, 28933
Mo´stoles, Madrid, Spain
∗ E-mail: daniele.vilone@gmail.com
∗∗ E-mail: anxo@math.uc3m.es
∗∗∗ E-mail: gardenes@gmail.com
Abstract. We study in detail the role of short-cuts in promoting the emergence of
cooperation in a network of agents playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG). We
introduce a model whose topology interpolates between the one-dimensional euclidean
lattice (a ring) and the complete graph by changing the value of one parameter (the
probability p to add a link between two nodes not already connected in the euclidean
configuration). We show that there is a region of values of p in which cooperation
is largely enhanced, whilst for smaller values of p only a few cooperators are present
in the final state, and for p → 1− cooperation is totally suppressed. We present
analytical arguments that provide a very plausible interpretation of the simulation
results, thus unveiling the mechanism by which short-cuts contribute to promote (or
suppress) cooperation.
PACS: 02.50.Le, 89.75.-k
1. Introduction
Cooperative behaviours are commonly observed in nature and in human society.
However, explaining its origin is not a trivial task [1–3]. Indeed, at the level of
individuals, selfish attitudes are often more convenient (as can be easily seen in many
animal behaviours), so that there must be some mechanisms that promote a sort of
crossover from the “micro” level (i.e., in the interactions between a few individuals), to
the “macro” one (when a great number of individuals is involved), where cooperation
in many cases prevails over defection, reversing the microscopic selfish trend.
Already Nowak and May [4] suggested that the topology of interactions could
be a fundamental factor enhancing the emergence of cooperation even though the
interaction at the individual level. A wealth of studies on evolutionary game theory
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on graphs spawned from this first, key insight [5–7], making clear that many factors
can favour (or hinder) global cooperative behaviours, as for instance the update rule
the individuals use to evolve their strategies (see Section 4 below) or the details of the
topology; in other words, the outcome of evolutionary games on graphs is far from being
universal. From the experimental viewpoint, the situation is similar, and reports that
the topology influences [8] or does not influence [9] the emergence of cooperation have
been published (although it must be kept in mind the networks used in those works
are very small, see [10], the maximum size ever tried being 13×13 [11]). Therefore, it
is worth improving our understanding of the role of both topology and update rules in
enhancing (or preventing) cooperation.
Among the topological features that play a key role in evolutionary games,
prominent ones are the degree distribution and the clustering. The degree distribution
and in particular whether it is of exponential type or has a long tail (scale free in
general) has been shown to lead to dramatical differences in behaviour [12,13]. As for the
clustering, research indicates that, depending on the specific dynamics, highly clustered
networks can promote the survival of initially cooperating agents as they interact mainly
among themselves, subsequently fostering the spreading of their strategy throughout
the whole system [4, 7, 14, 15]. This article is intended to disentagle these effects of
clustering from those arising from the existence of short-cuts in the network, which can
coexist in many relevant situations. Thus, the Watts-Strogats (WS) small-world [16]
network is the paradigmatic example of local behaviour, like an euclidean lattice, while
acting globally like a random network (thus having high clustering coefficient and low
diameter). Therefore, in this paper we will focus on a model network inspired by the WS
one, but with some remarkable differences with respect to it, in order to gain insights
on the role of short-cuts in the emergence and sustainability of cooperation.
To this end, the article has the following structure: In Section 2 we summarize the
background on the issue we address here. Subsequently, in Section 3 we introduce the
model network which we use as the tool of the study, basically a small-world network
with additional links. Section 4 presents then our main simulation results, followed in
Section 5 by some theoretical interpretations and implications. Finally, in Section 6 we
summarize our conclusions and discuss the future perspectives they open.
2. The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game and the evolution of cooperation
In a general evolutionary framework, N individuals interact through a game. At the
initial step every individual plays with a subset of the players and receives a total payoff
according to her action and her partners’ one. After that, players update their strategy
according to an a priori specified update rule. Within this framework, to properly
specify an evolutionary game one has to choose a game (defined by the payoffs to the
different actions players can take), an interaction set (with whom every agent plays each
time) and a payoff-dependent update rule (how agents modify the strategy governing
their actions). Evolutionary game theory on graphs [5] arises when the interaction set
Random topologies and the emergence of cooperation: the role of short-cuts 3
is defined as a network: the subset of the players with whom a given one interacts
is the set of her neighbours. Thus, in a complete graph all individuals are connected
(well-mixed population case or limit); in an euclidean square bidimensional lattice every
agent interacts with its four nearest neighbours, and so on. On a complex network, the
structure can be very complicated and the number of neighbours is in general different
for each agent.
The game we will consider is the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (PDG), the paradigmatic
model to study the emergence of cooperation [2]. The PDG is a 2× 2 symmetric game;
each player can cooperate (C), or defect (D). If both players cooperate, they get a reward
R, if both defect they get instead a punishment P , and finally if they adopt different
strategies the defector earns the temptation payoff T , whilst the cooperator receives
the sucker’s one S, with T > R > P ≥ S. Therefore, the unique Nash equilibrium
(a choice of actions for the players from which none of them has incentives to deviate,
see, e.g., [17]) is mutual defection, even though this is not a Pareto optimal solution,
i.e., there is another configuration, mutual cooperation, in which both players would
earn more: here lies the dilemma. Following Nowak and May [4], who first show that
cooperation could be enhanced by the presence of a lattice in the PDG, we choose
R = 1, T = b ∈ (1, 2] and P = S = 0. This choice (often referred to as the “weak
PDG”) does not change the essential physics of the model, makes the study easier and
reduces to one the number of free parameters of the game. While in a well-mixed
population (complete graph) a system of agents playing the PDG ends up in a frozen
state with only defectors [5,17–19] independently of the particular update rule adopted
by the agents, when the population structure is a lattice, the system may converge to
a final state with a non vanishing density of survived cooperators [4, 5, 7, 19, 20]. As
mentioned above, subsequent research showed that the effect of the topology is not
universal, mainly because it also depends strongly on the update rule adopted by the
players [7, 20–23] and not only on the particular topology. Below (see Sec. 4) we will
consider two update rules in order to asses the scope of our findings.
Regarding the second ingredient of the game, the network, our departure point is
the WS one, in its two different versions, WS [16], and Newman–Watts [24] (NW). In
the first one each link connecting two nearest neghbours in an unidimensional ring is
rewired (that is, one of its two nodes is changed) with probability p, whereas in the
latter case a short-cut (a new link connecting two originally separated nodes) is added
to each site again with probability p. Both versions of the model have the property
that, according to a parameter p ∈ [0, 1], its topology can be tuned from the euclidean
(for p = 0) to the completely random one (p = 1). In the middle, there is a range of
values (approximatedly 0 < p . 0.1) for which the network locally still behaves like a
regular lattice, but globally already as a random network [16,24,25]. Such models allow
us to focus on the effect the short-cuts in a complex network have over the dynamics
and evolution of cooperative behaviours.
To our knowledge, the fact that inserting long-range connections into a regular ring
can sensitively influence the evolution and stability of global cooperative behaviours was
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first noticed in [26]. Subsequently, researchers started studying the specific influence of
the decrease of the diameter due to the short-cuts and the onset of heterogeneity in
the network (that is, the appearance of hubs created by the added links). Thus, Santos
et al. [27] showed that in a perfectly homogeneous WS network cooperation is actually
enhanced, but less than in a heterogeneous network. Fu et al. [28] reported that there is
a peak of the final cooperator density at a certain value of degree heterogeneity, working
with a NW network where the short-cuts are added to some fixed hubs in order to have
a specified degree of heterogeneity h, defined as
h =
1
N
∑
k
k2n(k)− 〈k〉2 (1)
where N is the number of nodes of the network, n(k) gives the number of vertices with
k edges and 〈k〉 is the average degree. The maximum value of the final cooperation is
reached around h ≃ 0.2. A similar result was reached by Du et al. [29]. Additionally,
Vukov et al [30], showed that for homogeneous networks with dynamical noise (that
is, with the possibility for an individual to adopt the strategy of worse performing
neghbours) long-range connections can diminish the final defector density. Other studies
on small world (or similar) networks, but utilizing different games [31–33] or different
details of the dynamics, confirmed that short-cuts have a non trivial and often favourable
effect on the emergence of cooperation. On the other hand, on an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER)
network (totally random topology), cooperation is much more enhanced that in both
regular lattices and small-world systems [34], a result compatible with the previous
ones. In view of all this research, we can now state that tuning a network from the
one-dimensional ring to a totally random network, the cooperation in the final state
increases in general, even though there can be factors in the dynamics which could
sometimes alter this picture. The question then arises naturally as to what occurs if
we go instead from the ring topology to the complete graph, in which we know that
cooperation is totally suppressed. This is the specific question we aim at clarifying in
this work.
3. The Link Added Small World (LASW) network
Let us now introduce the model for the Link Added Small World (LASW, in the
following) network. The LASW network is defined from a regular one-dimensional ring
with N nodes: each site is connected to its 2m nearest neighbours (m ∈ N), so that
there are mN links (or edges). The diameter D0 (i.e., the average distance between two
randomly chosen nodes) and the clustering coefficient χ0(m) (i.e., the probability that
two neighbours of a third one are also neighbours of each other) of such a simple graph
are [25]
D0 =
N
2m
, (2)
χ0(m) =
3(m− 1)
2(2m− 1)
. (3)
Random topologies and the emergence of cooperation: the role of short-cuts 5
At this point, we can modify the regular ring by adding new links; that is, we add each
of the [N(N −1)/2−mN ] missing edges with probability p. Therefore, by varying p we
can tune the topology from euclidean to the complete-network as desired. In this model
network, it is easy to determine that for this kind of graphs the diameter is given by
D = D0 · f [(N − 2m− 1)p] , (4)
where the quantity (N − 2m− 1)p = x is the density of short-cuts per site and
f(x) =


1 x→ 0+
log(x)
x
x≫ 1 .
(5)
At the same time, the clustering coefficient is given in the thermodynamical limit by
χ(p,m) =


χ0(m) p = 0
p p ∈ (0, 1] .
(6)
Notice how for p 6= 0 the clustering coefficient is exactly given by the link adding
probability. The previous expression can be found directly by taking the thermodynamic
limit N → +∞ in the general result for the clustering coefficient
χN(p,m) = z · [χ0(m) + [1− χ0(m)] · p] + (1− z) · p ,
where z = z(N,m, p) = 2m/n¯(N,m, p) is the probability that two nodes are not
neighbours in the one-dimensional ring, and n¯ = 2m + p(N − 1 − 2m) is the average
number of neighbours per site. We highlight that, except for the case m = 1, the
sequence of functions χN (p,m), i.e. the sequence of cluster coefficients given by different
values of N , does not converge uniformly to the expression of χ(p,m) given in Eq. (6),
which is, therefore, a non-continuous function in p. On the other hand, such pathological
behaviour is not alarming, since simulations never deal with really infinite systems.
It is worth highlighting some remarkable topological features, which will be useful
below. First of all, let us consider for simplicity the case N ≫ 2m + 1, that is
N − 2m − 1 ≃ L. Calling p∗ = 2m/N , we have a crossover in the behaviour of
a LASW network. For p ≪ p∗ the number of short-cuts is still much smaller than
the number of regular links, and the system behaves similarly to a WS network with
rewiring probability pr = Np/(2m). In the opposite limit p≫ p
∗, the number of added
links is much larger than that of regular ones, and thus the behaviour of the system
approach that of an ER network [35]. Thus, a LASW network is in practice the sum of
a regular graph and an ER one, so that its degree distribution P (k) is always equal to
PER(k+2m), PER(k) being the equivalent distribution of an ER network with the same
p and N [i.e. a binomial distribution with mean value pN and variance p(1 − p)N ].
In the thermodynamical limit (N → +∞) we have p∗ → 0+ and the LASW network
behaves exactly like an ER one ∀p ∈ (0, 1], with neither its diameter nor its clustering
coefficient depending on m [except for χ(p = 0, m) = χ0(m)]. Moreover, the clustering
coefficient for m ≥ 2 becomes equal to the value it has exactly for m = 1. In practice,
for very large networks, the topology is independent of m.
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Figure 1. Cooperator density ρC [for temptation values of b = 1.05 (circles) and
b = 1.25 (diamonds)] in the asymptotic state for LASW networks with m = 1 and
N = 1000 as a function of the link-adding probability p. All agents use the UI update
rule. Note the logarithmic scale of the x axis.
4. Prisoner’s Dilemma game on LASW networks: Simulation results
We now use our model to investigate how the topology influences the emergence of
cooperation in a population whose individuals play the PDG. As stated above, we still
need to introduce the strategy update rules. Even though there are many possible
choices in literature [5, 7, 18], we present here only the two most commonly considered
ones: Unconditional imitation (UI) and replicator rule (REP). UI is a completely
deterministic rule (an automaton): At the end of each round of the game, every player
imitates the strategy of the neighbour which has obtained the best payoff provided it is
larger that her own payoff. In REP, agents choose a neighbour at random: If the payoff
of the chosen neighbour is lower than the agent’s own, nothing happens. If it is larger,
the agent will adopt the neighbour’s strategy with a probability proportional to the
difference between the two payoffs. These two rules differ in character (deterministic
versus stochastic) and in their outcomes in the presence of a homogeneous network
structure: indeed, UI promotes very much the appearance of cooperation whereas REP
does not [4, 7, 20, 21]. Therefore, while these two rules are by no means the whole
panorama of possible dynamics, they will allow us to compare different situations as far
as the emergence of cooperation is concerned.
Let us begin from the case of a one-dimensional ring, that is, the case p = 0, starting
from an initial configuration with fifty percent of cooperators, m = 1 and with UI as
the update rule. Numerical simulations show that the final cooperator density is around
0.14 for each value of b ∈ (1, 2] (we will give an analytical explanation for this value in
Sec. 5). On the other hand, in the opposite limit, p = 1, the topology corresponds to a
fully connected network, and thus there are no cooperators in the final configuration (see
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Figure 2. Cooperator density ρC [for temptation values of b = 1.05 (circles) and
b = 1.25 (diamonds)] in the asymptotic state for LASW networks with m = 1 and
N = 400 as a function of the link-adding probability p. All agents use the REP update
rule. Note the logarithmic scale of the x axis.
Section 2). Far from these two limits, highly non-trivial behaviour arises for intermediate
values of the link-adding probability p. In Fig. 1 we plot the final density of cooperators
on a system with UI dynamics, size N = 1000, temptation b = 1.05 and 1.25, and initial
cooperator density equal to 0.5. The results are really intriguing: For p ∈ [0.002, 0.2]
(b = 1.05), and for p ∈ [0.002, 0.02] (b = 1.25) there is a large plateau where cooperation
is dramatically enhanced with respect to both the one-dimensional ring (p = 0) and, of
course, the complete graph (p = 1). Such plateaus suggest the existence of an optimal
region of the link-adding probability starting at p ≃ p∗. As observed from Fig. 1 the
length of the optimal region decreases with b, as is the case with the cooperator density
as well. It is noticeable that the same picture emerges when the update rule used in the
system is the REP one, as clearly shown in Fig. 2: In this case we also observe an optimal
region of the link-adding probability (starting at p ≃ p∗) in which cooperation is very
large. This means that, apart from the (expected, [7,20]) smaller levels of cooperation in
each stage with respect to the UI system, the fundamental mechanism underlying such
phenomenon cannot be due to the update rule chosen, but to the topological features
of the network. To further support this claim, we have verified that when update rules
coexist in the population, the phenomenology remains practically unchanged, as shown
in Figure 3. Interestingly, even in such mixed dynamics UI rule enhances cooperation
more than REP one, coherently with the results presented in the literature mentioned
above. Finally, we note also that the cooperation levels of the two fractions of the
population are similar to those observed when the corresponding rule is the only one
used, providing further evidence of the independence of the results of the update rule
considered. It is thus clear that the existence of an optimal range of short-cut density
is due to structural features and thus it should be explained in topological terms.
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Figure 3. Cooperator density ρC (for a temptation value of b = 1.05) in the
asymptotic state for LASW networks with m = 1 and N = 1000 as a function of
the link-adding probability p. The system includes the two update strategies (half of
the agents use the UI rule, half the REP one). The update rules did not evolve in
time.
The above results correspond to the case m = 1, which as explained above we
expect to be representative of the evolutionary outcomes for larger values of the initial
degree at least for p > p∗. This is indeed verified in Fig. 4, where results for m = 2
and different systems sizes are shown. Our numerics confirm the existence of a similar
transition at p ≃ p∗ = 2m/N , where a plateau of large cooperation densities is observed
until this magnitude begins to decrease as p → 1−. It should be noted, however, that
there is an interesting (but not unexpected) difference with respect to the case m = 1
that arises from the behaviour for p → 0−. In this limit, the cooperative behaviour in
the frozen state is very high but, as we will see in the next Section, this is due to the
different geometrical properties of an euclidean ring with m ≥ 2. Notwithstanding this
special feature, the main conclusion of Fig. 4 is that for p & p∗ the behaviour of the
system is independent of m, in the same way of the topology itself of the system.
Finally, in order to present a more complete picture, we have also analyzed the
case in which strategies and strategy update rules co-evolve, a line of work that has
attracted much interest recently [18]. We will consider the approach proposed in [19], in
which agents that decide to copy the strategy of a neighbour copy her strategy update
rule as well. Recent results [34] show that such a co-evolutionary process gives rise to
different results depending on the topologies and the rules that are initially present in
the population. We have therefore carried out simulations with both strategy update
rules present in the population in different initial fractions, and allowing them to be
adopted as described above. Figure 5 shows that even with evolving update rules,
around p ≃ 0.01 cooperation is once again promoted, for values up to about b ≃ 1.4.
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Figure 4. Cooperator density ρC (for a temptation value of b = 1.05) in the
asymptotic state of LASW networks with m = 2 and N = 1000 as a function of
the link-adding probability p. All agents use the UI update rule. Note the logarithmic
scale of the x axis.
This is a further hint on the robustness of the cooperation enhancement process due to
the short-cuts. In accordance with the results above, we note that the range in which
the cooperation is enhanced decreases with the density of initial replicators. Therefore,
all our results show that there are some values of p (and thus of the clustering coefficient,
− see Section 3), in which cooperative behaviour is largely enhanced regardless of the
initial degree of the network and of the evolutionary dynamics. In the next Section
we give some theoretical explanations of this phenomenon, which certainly plays an
important role in the promotion of cooperation on complex networks.
5. Discussion
5.1. One-dimensional ring
Let us start our analysis from the simplest case: the one-dimensional ring with m = 1
(i.e. the case with two neighbours, one left and one right, per site), in which agents
play PDG with UI as microscopical update rule. We will begin by showing that the
asymptotic cooperation density does not depend on b. Having b ∈ (1, 2], this is an
immediate consequence of the remarkable property of the dynamics that a defector
never changes strategy: Indeed, a defector surrounded by at least one cooperator earns
at each game a payoff Π ≥ b > 1, whilst a cooperator surrounded by at least one defector
earns a payoff Π˜ ≤ 1 < Π, so that a D-strategist will never find a better performing
neighbour with C strategy. Thus, the evolution of the system is independent of the
value of b, provided b > 1. Furthermore, it follows that the cooperator density (that
is, the average number of cooperators over the total number of agents) is a decreasing
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Figure 5. The cooperator density ρC in the asymptotic state for LASW networks
with m = 1, N = 2000 and p = 0.01, as a function of the temptation b and of the
initial density Fui(0) of imitators in the initial stage, is shown by means of a color
scale. Update rules (UI and REP) coevolve with the strategies as described in the
text; the initial density of cooperators is equal to 0.5. Note that the larger Fui(0), the
larger the asymptotic level of cooperation.
function of time: ρ∞C ≤ ρ0, where ρ
∞
C = limt→+∞ ρC(t) and ρ0 = ρC(t = 0) are the final
and initial cooperator densities respectively.
As a second result, we will now show that a necessary condition for a cooperator
not to change strategy is to be set in the middle of a cluster of at least three consecutive
cooperators. To this end, let us note that a configuration of the form DDCCCDD
with cooperators in the boundaries is stable, because the payoffs of the 7 players are
respectively b, b, 1, 2, 1, b, b. Thus, the defectors and the central cooperator do not have
any reason to change, while the cooperators in the boundary of their cluster imitate the
central one, and hence they keep the C strategy. Nevertheless, reasoning as above, it
must be noticed that a configuration DCCCDC (with cooperators in the boundary)
evolves toDCCDDD and finally toDDDDDD. In general, isolated defectors give birth
to a triplet of D-strategists: . . . CCCCDCCCC . . . goes to . . . CCCDDDCCC . . .,
which is a stable configuration.
Having the above considerations in mind, we can say that the final cooperator
density must be proportional to the density of clusters of at least three consecutive
cooperators in the initial state, minus the effect of the initially isolated defectors α(ρ0).
Then, we can write down
ρC = 3(1− ρ0)ρ
3
0(1− ρ0) + 4(1− ρ0)ρ
4
0(1− ρ0) + . . .− α(ρ0) , (7)
where each term l(1−ρ0)ρ
l
0(1−ρ0) is the contribution of initial clusters of l cooperators
to ρC (that is, the number of cooperators l in the cluster times the probability to
find one defector, then l consecutive cooperators, finally another defector in the initial
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configuration). Besides, we have α(x) ∈ [0, 1) and limx→0+ α(x) = limx→1− α(x) = 0.
The previous equation can be rewritten as
ρC = ρ
3
0(1− ρ0)
2
+∞∑
j=0
(j + 3)ρj0 − α(ρ0) = ρ
3
0 · (3− 2ρ0)− α(ρ0) . (8)
We stress the fact that the infinite sum in equations (7) and (8) does converge
correctly to 1 for ρ0 → 1
−, as can be easily seen in the last member of the (8).
As in our simulations we always started from ρ0 = 0.5, we have to evaluate
the correction term α(ρ0 = 0.5). This can be cumbersome, but the most important
correction around ρ0 ≃ 0.5 is that arising from configurations of the form . . .DCC . . .
CCDCC . . . CCD . . ., i.e. two clusters of consecutive C-strategists being made up by
at least three cooperators. Each of such initial configurations leads to the removal of the
two cooperators surrounding the central defector. In fact the effect is somewhat larger,
because some clusters with 3 cooperators are removed when they are close to a larger
cooperator cluster as explained above. Ignoring this effect as a first approximation we
can compute, analogously to the previous calculation
α(ρ0) ≃ 3P3(1− ρ0)P3 =
3ρ60
1− ρ0
, (9)
with
P3 = (1− ρ0)
2 · (ρ30 + ρ
4
0 + ρ
5
0 + . . .) = ρ
3
0(1− ρ0)
2
+∞∑
j=0
ρj0 =
ρ30
1− ρ0
.
Then, in case of one-dimensional rings with degree equal to 2 and ρ0 = 0.5, from
equations (8) and (9) we find ρC ≃ 0.156, with an 8% error respect to the real value of
about 0.143. This good (even though imperfect) agreement shows that we have indeed
identified the main mechanisms governing the evolution in the one-dimensional ring.
Note also that the general behaviour described above (cooperator density decreasing
function of time, with final value only depending on the initial configuration) holds for
rules such as UI and REP, where there is no possibility of making mistakes, i.e. one node
never copies the strategy of a neighbour with smaller payoff. In this context, it is worth
noticing that the model discussed in this subsection is very close to the one described
by Eshel and coworkers [36], where mistakes are possible and defectors (called ”egoists”
in the paper by Eshel et al.) can at some point become cooperators (”altruists”).
5.2. The role of short-cuts
Let us now consider the case of p > 0 (always with m = 1). It is easy to see that the
presence of short-cuts changes in general the stability of a configuration. In particular,
it is no longer true that ρ∞C ≤ ρ0. Indeed, think of a long cluster of defectors, a
configuration which is stable in a ring. If we connect one of the internal agents with
a far away cooperator surrounded by two other C-strategists, at the subsequent step
the long-range connected defector will flip toward cooperation. More generally, the fact
that a defector can be directly connected with more than two cooperators makes the
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transition D → C possible, so that ρ∞C is expected to increase with p increasing, at least
for small values of the link adding probability. On the other hand, in the limit p→ 1−
we know that the cooperation level must vanish [19]. Therefore, we expect a non trivial
behaviour with a maximum of cooperation at some value p˜ ∈ (0, 1). Actually, as shown
in Figure 1, in numerical simulations we see a relatively long plateau with a great level
of cooperation around p ∼ 0.01.
Such behaviour can be understood by means of topological considerations. As
pointed out in Section 3, our network undergoes a sort of (smooth) transition at
p ∼ p∗ = 2k/L. Indeed, for smaller values of p the system is topologically equivalent
to a WS small-world network, whilst for larger values it behaves like an ER one. When
we consider the system in Figure 1, we have p∗ ≃ 0.002, and we correspondingly see
a sudden increase of the final cooperation just around this value itself. Moreover, in
the WS regime the number of short-cuts is not enough yet to affect appreciably the
dynamics of the system (there is only a very slight increase of the final cooperators due
to the effect described just above). However, when this number becomes large enough
(more precisely, when the number of the sort-cuts is larger than that of regular links),
the presence of several hubs connected with stable cooperators makes the configuration
of the system very favorable to the final emergence of the cooperation. Finally, when p
approaches 1, the number of short-cuts becomes so large that the system is practically a
fully connected graph, hubs are no longer hubs but they are almost like any other node,
and the cooperation is completely suppressed [19].
Similar effects happen for m ≥ 2, but in that case everything is much more
complicated. In any event, in the one dimensional case (p = 0) the dynamics is again
purely deterministic (with the UI update rule), and the final frozen state depends only
on the initial configuration of the system. Given the random initial conditions we
are using, the cooperator density of the frozen state is around 0.96, for large enough
system sizes. This means that, for an euclidean ring, increasing the coordination number
enhances enormously the cooperation. This could be expected because, following the
reasoning illustrated above, with 4 neighbours, a cooperator is likely to be imitated by
a defector. For example, let us consider the border between two long clusters, each of
opposite strategy (see Figure 6). Here, provided that b ∈ (1, 3/2), the first defector is
connected with a cooperator with larger payoff, so that she will flip at the next stage
to the C strategy (whilst no cooperator is connected with an analogous better-fitting
defector). Consequently, the cooperator cluster will increase its size in one unit at each
time step, until a frozen state almost completely full of cooperators is reached. In case
the dynamics was given by the REP rule, the result is the same, although the time scale
needed to reach the asymptotic scale is much longer due to the probabilistic nature of
the rule.
When short-cuts are added, we have again a different regime, depending on whether
p < p∗ or p > p∗. In the first regime, there are less short-cuts than regular links,
and hence the system is topologically like a WS small-world network with m = 2, i.e.
globally it behaves like a random network (very low diameter) whilst locally it resembles
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Figure 6. Sample of elementary dynamics on the boundary between two long clusters
of different strategy (m = 2); the numbers above the individuals (singled out by their
strategy) are the payoffs earned after just that time step. With the UI microscopical
update rule and b ∈ (1, 3/2), the cooperating cluster gains one position at each
elementary time step.
a regular lattice (clustering coefficient almost constant around χ0(m = 2) = 1/2, which
decreases reaching a minimum only for p → p∗). When a few short-cuts are present
in the system, defection is initially enhanced for the same mechanism that promotes
cooperation for m = 1: A short-cut could connect a cooperator with a defector with
larger payoff, driving the first to change her strategy to defection. Finally, once that
p > p∗, the system becomes equivalent to an ER random network and the cooperation
is enhanced again, until for p large enough we end up with a complete graph where
only defectors survive. As can be seen in Figure 4, for each value of N , and hence of
p∗ = 2m/N , the final level of cooperation decreases when p . p∗, then increases rapidly
as soon as p & p∗, before vanishing completely for p→ 1−, confirming the interpretation
given above.
It must be noticed that all the reasoning and considerations we have done in this
section assume that the microscopical update rule is the unconditional imitation. We
have also indicated along the way that choosing the REP rule will only change the
time scale of the evolution. In addition, in so far as there is no possibility of mistakes,
the general scheme proposed above also holds with mixed update rules (see Figures 3
and 5): Cooperation is mostly suppressed for p . p∗ (WS topology), greatly enhanced
for p & p∗ (ER topology), and totally suppressed for p → 1− (fully connected graph
topology). The robustness of such scheme with respect to the update rules adopted by
the individuals confirms the fundamental role of the short-cuts for the ultimate fate of
the dynamics.
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6. Conclusions and perspectives
In this paper we have investigated how the topology of a system in which a population
of many individuals interact by means of the PDG can influence the emergence of
stable cooperative behaviours, focusing on the effect of short-cuts. For this purpose we
exploited a simple model which can assume different topological features of different
systems (euclidean lattice, WS small-world network, ER random network, and fully
connected graph) by tuning only the value of a single parameter p ∈ [0, 1] (the link-
adding probability). In this way, it is easier to distinguish the precise role each particular
topology plays in enhancing (or suppressing) cooperation. In particular, we have shown
how a regular euclidean lattice promotes cooperation only for m ≥ 2, m being the
coordination number of a one-dimensional ring, while for m = 1 only a small minority
of cooperators survives in the final frozen state. We have also seen that the WS
topology does not enhance cooperation, whilst the ER network configuration is the
best cooperation promoter of all in this family. Finally, as was already well known, in a
fully connected graph (or, equivalently, in the mean-field approximation) only defectors
can survive in the final state.
Since the only free parameter of the network model is the link-adding probability p
and the results do not depend on the particular dynamics considered, it is the density of
short-cuts actually existing in the system that must determine the ultimate fate of the
dynamics. Indeed, when 0 < p . p∗, the presence of short-cuts (whose number is still
smaller than that of regular links) causes at most a perturbation of the configuration
emerging in the euclidean case (the final level of cooperation is very slightly increased
if m = 1, not dramatically decreased otherwise), while for p & p∗ in the network many
hubs appear, and a cooperator hub is very likely to act as a seed for the spreading
of the cooperation throughout the whole system. By means of such a mechanism, the
cooperation is enhanced much more than in the other topological regimes. Finally, when
p→ 1−, every site ends up being connected with all the others and the system becomes
a fully connected graph, where only defectors can survive.
The picture that emerges from our research (that reached the limit of the fully
connected network) and from previous works [26–30] is that the ER topology may be the
best one among homogeneous or mildly heterogeneous graphs to promote cooperation,
and that this property is quite robust, given that the same (qualitatively) behaviour
can be found with different update rules (UI and REP dynamics), and also mixing them
and letting them co-evolve in the same system. We want to stress that this mechanism
for the promotion of cooperation has nothing to do with the one based on clustering
discussed in [7,20], as the clustering of the networks where we observe a plateau in the
cooperation level is very small (∼ p). This is hence a novel mechanism that has not been
discussed before and that confers to short-cuts a very important role in the emergence
of cooperation. In fact, they can be used to eliminate the effect of topological traps
discussed in [37], which arises due to the existence of bottlenecks and lack of redundant
paths. The work summarized here confirms that a not so large fraction of short-cuts
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can have dramatic effects on the final level of cooperation achieved in the population
and clarifies the origin of this mechanism. On the other hand, a more-in-depth study of
the role of other update rules is still needed; in particular, in the present work we have
neglected the family of rules allowing the agents to make some mistakes, i.e., allowing
an agent to imitate a worse-fitting neighbour, as for instance happens with the Moran
rule [20, 38] or with the dynamics in [30]. The case of a two-dimensional initial lattice
is also interesting, although we envisage that in that case it will be difficult, if not
impossible, to gain insights from an analytical viewpoint as we have done here. Future
works should deal with these issues.
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